[Haskell-cafe] why is Random in System?
rrnewton at gmail.com
Wed Aug 17 20:10:30 CEST 2011
The problem with Mersenne twister is that it doesn't split well. The main
reason for crypto prng in this package would not be to advertise to people
that "System.Random can be used for security-related apps" *but to make
splitting reasonably safe*. It's not good enough to have a known-bad
generator under splitting provided as the default. And I think we need
splitting, especially as more Haskell programs become parallel. Would it
address your concerns to not mention the crypto nature of the standard
implementation in the System.Random documentation?
I think there's also a reasonable argument to lean towards *correctness* over
performance in Haskell's defaults. For example, unconstrained Num bindings
default to Integer and likewise random numbers could be as strong as
possible by default, and those looking for raw rands/sec throughput could
make other informed choices.
I had thought that maybe we could bifurcate the "stdgen" concept into a fast
and a strong version, which could be say Mersenne Twister and AES
respectively. But, again, the problem comes if the fast version is expected
to be splittable as well.
With "SplittableGen" factored out from "RandomGen" I suppose it would be
possible for the fast version to NOT offer splitting. However, Mersenne
Twister is best used with an imperative interface, you can see the tension
in the pure version of the mersenne package on hackage:
Please also see Burton Smith's comments below in response to my proposal to
offer a MT + AES combination.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Burton Smith <burtons at microsoft.com>
Date: Tue, Jun 28, 2011 at 1:28 PM
Subject: RE: AESNI-based splittable random number generation for Haskell
To: "Newton, Ryan R" <ryan.r.newton at intel.com>
Mersenne Twister (MT)is a poor choice in my opinion. First, the generator
state is large (2496 bytes) and it must be copied on each call to next.
Split is worse; it will generate twice as many bytes per call as next will.
Second, I see no good way to guarantee independence of the two generators
emanating from a split. MT is hard to initialize anyway, and giant-stepping
it to define the newly split generator (as we did back in the 80's paper) is
not only hard for an LFSR like MT but, worse yet, it doesn't work for
Haskell or other fine-grain concurrent languages because split and next will
commute. Other tree RNGs, e.g. SPRNG, have the same commutativity issue.
Block ciphers address this issue head-on by reducing the split independence
problem to a crypto problem.
A better choice might be some block cipher other than AES. Two
possibilities are XTEA and RC4. Both are in Wikipedia. RC4 has 256 bytes
of key "state", still bigger than I would like.
Another scheme is to make the number of rounds an option. With AESNI, this
On Wed, Aug 17, 2011 at 12:26 PM, Ertugrul Soeylemez <es at ertes.de> wrote:
> Ryan Newton <rrnewton at gmail.com> wrote:
> Using a cryptographically strong random number generator here is
> probably a very bad idea. Two reasons:
> Firstly while being faster than the current implementation an AES-based
> implementation will still be considerably slower than the Mersenne
> Twister algorithm. This may or may not be true, if hardware AES support
> is there, but don't just assume that everybody has AES instructions now.
> For example I don't have them.
> Secondly there is no standard requiring that the default random number
> generator is cryptographically safe. Changing this particular
> implementation, which is the one most people use, to a CSPRNG will make
> people take for granted that System.Random is safe to use in
> security-related products, because it would be very convenient. This
> will render strong security products trivially weak, when compiled with
> the wrong Haskell distribution, and you will find packages with
> statements like: "We assume that you use Ryan Newton's distribution of
> the random package."
> I would rather propose the Mersenne Twister as the default random number
> generator. You could add AES as a secondary generator for people
> requiring cryptographic strength, but then do it properly, i.e. impure,
> because most people, when reading about a PRNG with "AES" anywhere in
> its name, will just assume that it's a CSPRNG.
> nightmare = unsafePerformIO (getWrongWife >>= sex)
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