hackage, cabal-get, and security
john at repetae.net
Thu May 19 21:02:48 EDT 2005
On Thu, May 19, 2005 at 04:30:47PM -0700, Isaac Jones wrote:
> John Meacham <john at repetae.net> writes:
> > I strongly think that hackage need not worry or deal with web of trust
> > or identity at all (but like using gpg for end-to-end security a lot).
> > Tying a gpg key to a physical identity is a big can of worms and frankly
> > irrelevant for hackages purposes. What is important is that no one other
> > than the author or an authors delegate is able to modify a package after
> > it has been created. To enforce this, all that is needed is to verify
> > the gpg key matches the one that was used to initially create the
> > project. that is all.
> > Hackage need not and should not worry whether a key is 'John Meacham's
> > official key, or just a one-off key created for the specific purpose of
> > managing a hackage project or the identity of an AI that writes haskell
> > packages in its infinite spare time. The whole idea of tying a key to an
> > existential identity is flawed, let the key _be_ the identity and all
> > problems go away.
> > Note that this doesn't mean that people can't match keys to individual
> > state issued identities if they want, but that will be specifically
> > orthogonal to hackage which only cares about matching keys and not what
> > is behind them.
> In a sense, that's what I'm proposing...
> It's just that in my version, we _also_ have a set of keys which are
> tied to identities for those who care. There are flaws in having keys
> tied to identities, but it is definitely an extra layer of security.
I just think it needs to be clear that any such network is purely
optional and independent of hackage. Trust networks are complicated but
useful beasts, and it should not be that hackage is taking on this
complication, but rather able to make use of it if desired.
Here are two plausable things I might care about when downloading a
A) That it was written by the John Meacham who lives in pasadena, ca and
went to Caltech that I know personally and trust to not put anything
B) That is was written by the author of package 'foo' who I trust
because I have read and used their code in the past and it is top notch.
note, a key ring is only needed to answer questions about A, but not B.
I surmise that B is the method most people will care about since as a
group, we mainly know about each other online and anyone we know in
person we can just ask for the public key of.
I would go further and say a trusted key ring actually gives a false
sense of security when it isn't used to verify people you 'trust' for
other reasons. If Billy Badperson asked me to sign his key saying he
was Billy Badperson then I would do so, because all I am asserting is
that he is who he claims (and I'd rather him identify himself than be
anonymous!). NOT that he won't introduce mallicious or buggy code.
So, all in all, I think the gpg proposal is very good as long as we
don't require anything of the keys like they be in a trusted key ring or
something. hackage should just verify they match the key assosiated with
an account and nothing else. This also has the great advantage of
decreasing the barrier to entry which is vital for a project like this.
John Meacham - ⑆repetae.net⑆john⑈
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